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A LABOR LAWYER'S VIEW OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
JULIUS GETMAN*
Legal argument is serious business. Important issues of national
policy are regularly determined and large sums of money are
allocated by the acceptance or rejection of legal argument-this is
why people hire lawyers, why so many young people want to become
lawyers, and why hidden behind lawyer jokes is a combination of awe,
envy, and anger. Explaining the significance of legal argument to the
public is a major industry. One has but to turn on the television set to
find prominent lawyers, law professors, prosecutors, and former
judges discussing the intricacies of the legal process. Thus, one would
be well advised to take legal argument seriously. It is not as clear that
legal argument is worthy of its importance. Do the best legal
arguments lead to just results?
Law professors generally assume that a strong correlation exists
between sound legal argument and sound policy. My own view is
increasingly skeptical. How can legal argument lead to justice when it
is so rarely informed about, and is increasingly removed from, the
lives of people affected by it? My skepticism is reinforced by years of
scholarship in and practice of labor relations law. The more I have
learned, the less satisfied I have become with the legal rules and the
way they are formulated.
The system of regulation created since the passage of the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),1 the focus of my teaching
and scholarship, evidences class bias, confusion, contradiction, and
ignorance. Decisions by the Labor Board and the courts reflect a
profound lack of understanding of the industries and practices they
regulate and of the legitimate interests of the parties affected by their
decisions. As a result, a statute aimed at promoting the interests of
workers by securing their rights to unionize, strike, and bargain
collectively has been transformed into a complex system of rules that
ignores, misinterprets, and undervalues these rights.
* Professor, University of Texas Law School.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). The NLRA, enacted in 1935, is also known as the
"Wagner Act."
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The pattern of undervaluing worker interests is longstanding.
Shortly after passage of the Wagner Act,2 which both announced the
legality and stressed the importance of the right to strike, the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.3
announced in dicta, with no serious discussion about the need for
such a rule or of its costs, that employees who exercised the right to
strike may be permanently replaced Because the Court has
reaffirmed the Mackay doctrine on several occasions without really
justifying it, subsequent legal decisions have used the rule as a starting
point for decisions limiting the rights of strikers, presumably pursuant
to the assumption that employer interests are thereby protected. In
fact, empirical evidence suggests that the interests of employers can
be adequately protected by giving them the right to hire temporary
replacements,' something the Court has never even considered.
Neither has the Court addressed the impact of the Mackay doctrine
on strikers.
The harm caused by the Mackay doctrine over the years has
been immense. Permanent replacement of striking workers has
wrecked lives and lifelong friendships, destroyed families and entire
communities, and even resulted in death.6 Yet its consequences
rarely, if ever, come to the attention of lawyers, judges, or legal
academics. Permanently replaced strikers are largely invisible-
separated by class, location, experience, and occupation from those
who frame and respond to legal argument. No mention of the
doctrine's consequences on the lives of those it directly affects has
appeared in legal argument and none, or almost none,7 in judicial
opinions. Additionally, academics who are ignorant of Mackay's
practical workings and who are deluded by myths of interest
balancing and the beneficent market continue to defend it.8 Every
right granted to employees by the NLRA, including the right to
organize, strike, bargain collectively, and make common cause, has
2. See id.
3. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
4. See id. at 344.
5. 1 have discussed this issue with executives, managers, and officers of many paper
companies in writing a book on the strike against International Paper Company (see infra note
6) and in subsequent meetings.
6. The impact of the Mackay doctrine on striking workers and their families, supervisors,
community, and line crossers over the course of ten years is described in JULIUS GETMAN, THE
BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14 (1998).
7. I know of no such decision, but perhaps one exists.
8. See generally Douglas L. Leslie, Retelling the International Paper Story, 102 YALE L.J.
1897 (1993).
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been cut down, subjected to technical complication, and made
dangerous to exercise. Nowhere is this more evident than in the law
that supposedly gives to employees the right to freely choose union
organization without fear of economic consequences. But the law
gives employers a marked advantage in being able to make captive
audience speeches to its employees without giving the union a right to
respond.9 Experienced union organizers know that employees who
are identified early as union supporters run a major risk of being fired
and that the remedies intended to protect this right are woefully
inadequate.1°
In a recent article, I compared labor law decisions to the battle
strategy of British army officers in World War I who, "like most of
the country's elite, believed that class, rank, and education gave
certain people the ability and the right to make rules to control the
conduct of people whose situation they did not understand and whose
experiences they did not share."" I am far from alone in my
pessimistic view of the labor laws. One of the deans of U.S. labor law,
Professor Summers, recently stated, "The Wagner Act has failed in its
purposes."12 He concludes that the courts have resisted and distorted
the basic purposes of the NLRA.13 A distinguished senior labor
9. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
10. See generally PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990). The empirical study of union representation elections
that I conducted together with Professors Goldberg and Brett convinced me that the elaborate
system of regulation established by the NLRB and the courts to govern union organizing is
based on assumptions that, when tested, turned out to be misleading, mistaken, and inconsistent
with the behavior of employees and the policies of the Wagner Act. Under this system, in order
to promote free choice by employees, employer speech is carefully controlled and union access
to employees severely limited. Our data and interviews with union organizers made clear that a
system of greater employer speech and greater union access would make far more sense. Our
conclusion that access to employees is more valuable than limiting employer speech has been
agreed to by every union organizer with whom I have spoken. Yet such a change in the law is
now inconceivable.
11. Julius G. Getman, Of Labor Law and Birdsong, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1345, 1348-49
(1998).
12. Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective Labor Law, 47 CATH.
U. L. REV. 791, 794 (1998).
13. See id. at 813-16. Enacted in 1935, the Wagner Act declared the public policy of the
United States to be one of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1935). The premises and purposes of collective bargaining were threefold.
First, in section 1 of the statute, the drafters recognized the "inequality of bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of [collective]
ownership." Id. Second, free collective bargaining was viewed as a market alternative to
legislative control. Third, collective bargaining would serve the social purpose of enriching
democracy by giving workers a voice in decisions of industry affecting their working lives.
Unfortunately, the last two purposes, relying on collective bargaining to reduce
government intervention and providing workers a measure of industrial democracy, have been
1999]
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scholar, Professor Schatzki, believes that my view is, if anything,
unduly optimistic because he finds implied in my criticism the hope
that regulation could be made fairer if scholars provided the courts
with greater information about the reality of labor relations. He
concludes that:
While the judges' ignorance may make it easier for them to do what
they do, it is not ignorance, I believe, that accounts primarily for
their consistently unfriendly-to-the-labor-movement holdings.
While appreciating that causation for judges' actions is multiple and
complicated, I believe there is a heavy thumb on the scales. It's
simple: judges don't like labor unions.14
In a recent book, Professor Gross describes the transformation of
the NLRA from a law "intended to democratize vast numbers of
American workplaces so that workers could participate in the
employment decisions that most directly affected their lives [by] ...
encourag[ing] ... the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining"'15 to one that "legitimizes employer opposition to the
organization of employees, collective bargaining, and industrial
democracy." 6
The failures of labor law inevitably point to the failures of legal
argument more generally. Labor law is a field in which specialists and
experts abound. Interpretation of the NLRA has involved a continual
effort by expert lawyers representing labor, management, and the
public to explicate the law; decisions by carefully selected
administrative law judges, overseen by the National Labor Relations
Board, supported by a large, expert legal staff; a great deal of careful
scholarly analysis by professors of law and industrial relations; and
final interpretation by the courts of appeals, in whose ranks are to be
found a considerable number of distinguished former academics, and
the Supreme Court. But legal expertise and skilled arguments are
inadequate. Both those who make legal arguments and those who
largely lost from view, not only by courts and commentators, but also by unions.
Courts have taken an additional step in clouding the first purpose by declaring that the
purpose of the statute is "industrial peace." Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954); see also
NLRB v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 174 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 1999); NLRB v. Quinn
Restaurant Corp., 14 F.3d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1994); Martinsville Nylon Employees Council Corp.
v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. UAW, 856 F.2d 579, 587
(3d Cir. 1988).
14. George Schatzki, It's Simple: Judges Don't Like Labor Unions, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1365,
1365 (1998).
15. Julius Getman, Broken Promise: The Subversion of U.S. Labor Relations Policy, 1974-
1994, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 515 (1997) (reviewing JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE:
THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1974-1994 (1995)).
16. GROSS, supra note 15, at ix.
[Vol. 74:409
A LABOR LAWYER'S VIEW OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
accept or reject them have developed what expertise they possess
largely by reading cases, treatises, and law review articles-none of
which are likely to reflect a basic understanding of reality.
Professor Markovits, in responding to an earlier draft of this
article, took the position that legal argument based on incorrect
factual conclusions is not good legal argument. His justification for
good legal argument is hardly reassuring. Given that no actor in the
process-whether lawyer, Labor Board member, judge, or
academic-is likely to be adequately informed, how are we to
distinguish between good and incorrect legal argument? We can't be
surprised that the system developed through partisan argument-
responded to by judges likely to be both partisan and ignorant-is
beset by contradiction and injustice.
The difficulties with labor law cannot be solved by traditional
non-fact-based techniques of legal decision-making. The NLRA itself,
even as bolstered by its legislative history, provides few answers to
the many questions raised by its vague general language. It tells us
that an employer may not "interfere" with the rights of employees to
form, join, and support unions, 7 but it does not spell out or even
indicate what conduct or speech runs afoul of this broad prohibition.
Similar vague language, often suggesting contradictory policies, is
found throughout the NLRA.1 Nor would it be possible to resolve
issues by resorting to precedent as harmonized by legal scholarship.
In the sixty years of the NLRA's existence, the Board and the courts
have developed a body of precedent noteworthy for being
inconsistent, highly technical, and unpredictable. Professorial
contributions are similarly inconsistent.
At one time I thought that labor law could be significantly
improved by empirical scholarship; my first major effort in that area
convinced me otherwise."9 Obtaining relevant and reliable data is
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).
18. See generally JULIUS GETMAN & BETRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE
BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 4-5 (1998).
19. Professors Goldberg, Brett, and I labored for six years to develop a body of data that
would shed light on the law governing the representation process. Our methodology was praised
by reviewers and courts, but inevitably the data were subject to differing interpretations. We
saw in the data a strong argument for deregulating much of the process. Professor Dickens
reanalyzed our data and came to slightly different conclusions. See William Dickens, Union
Representation Elections: Campaign and Vote (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author). Professor Weiler, based on his
reading of Dickens, argued that our conclusions and our data pointed in different directions. See
Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983). The Board at one time referred to our data in changing
a small aspect of its doctrine. See Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
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difficult and the data are likely to be ignored or distorted by the
process of legal argument. Decision-makers distrust counterintuitive
data, expert witnesses can obscure and confuse their meaning, and the
legislature can easily override their implications based on partisan
agendas.
I once thought that labor law was unique: different from other
areas of law in which legal argument is based on a better
understanding of underlying reality and in which other techniques of
decision-making are more likely to lead to just results. Conversations
with colleagues and occasional forays into different areas convince
me that, in fact, labor law is typical of our legal system with all its
contradictions and injustices.
Our system is almost certain to continue promulgating court-
made rules based on erroneous assumptions. We cannot fall back on a
more modest version of justice in which rules are understood,
predictable, and routinely applied. We have too many rules, too many
jurisdictions, too many judges, and too many decision makers. 20 That
our system works as well as it does is less a tribute to the nature of
legal argument than to the remarkable diversity of the American
political system.
This singular bow to empirical research was greeted with suspicion and criticism by Board
members and commentators. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 183-85 (12th ed. 1996). The Board quickly abandoned the effort. In the twenty
years since our study, very little careful work has been done and decisions by the Board and the
courts in this critical area continue to be based on conjecture and surmise.
20. I have finally concluded that the only way in which justice can be achieved in labor is
for working people to organize and become politically powerful.
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